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Roush: Manufacturing Process Which Includes Use of Mathematical Formula

PATENT LAW-Patentable Subject Matter- Manufacturing
Process Which Includes Use of Mathematical Formula and
Computer Program Constitutes Patentable Subject Matter.

-U.S.-,

Diamond v. Diehr,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981).

Diehr and Lutton applied for a patent on a process for operating molding presses used in the manufacture of rubber products. The process entailed heating synthetic rubber for an exact period of time in a mold. The
constant temperature inside the mold was measured and fed into a computer which repeatedly calculated the cure time by use of a mathematical
equation.' When the mold had been heated long enough, according to the
equation, the computer signaled the press to open automatically. The
patent examiner rejected the patent claims as non-patentable subject
matter under title 35, section 101 of the United States Code.2 The United
States Patent & Trademark Office Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's opinion. 3 The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
however, reversed.4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.,

1. See Diamond v. Diehr, -.U.S.., -,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1052-53 n.5, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155,
161 n.5 (1981). Variables in the formula included the geometric shape of the mold, the constant temperature of the mold during molding, and the type of compound heated. See id. at
- 101 S. Ct. at 1051-52, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 160. The inventors claimed their process ensured a
perfect cure, something the rest of the industry had not been able to uniformly achieve. See
id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1052 n.3, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 160 n.3. A digital computer works with
information that is in digital or character form, including alphabetic and other symbols as

well as numbers. See generally M.

WEIK, STANDARD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS

AND INFOR-

81 (1970).
Numbers in a digital computer are represented as space-time distributions in media such as punched-holes, . . . [and] magnetized spots in a surface of tapes ....
The typical digital computer is the internally stored program, electronic type that can
store instructions calling for the execution of sequences of operations, execute these
instructions, and modify them according to the results obtained, as well as store and
utilize the data to be operated upon.
Id. at 81. This differs from an analog computer which "measures values, like an ordinary
voltmeter .... " See id. at 80.
2. See Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.-.,
, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1052-53, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155,
161-62 (1981); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
3. See Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.....,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1053, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 162
(1981).
4. See In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 989 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
5. See Diamond v. Diehr, -. U.S.-,
-, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1059, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 169
(1981).
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Held-Affirmed. A manufacturing process which includes the use of a
mathematical formula and a computer program constitutes patentable
subject matter.
The patent is a form of trade protection which allows protection for the
final product, as well as the underlying basis upon which it is developed.'
Several criteria must be satisfied in order to obtain a patent on an invention." Initially, the claimed subject matter must fall within a statutory
category.8 Under title 35, section 101 of the United States Code, patents
may only be sought for a process, a manufacture, a machine, or a composition of matter.' The claimed subject matter must also meet additional
conditions of patentability, such as utility,10 novelty, " non-obviousness, 2
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (patentee receives 17 year monopoly and "right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention"). The patent offers more protection to
the inventor than the copyright, which does not protect the idea or techniques of development. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
See generally P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS II-1 (2d ed. 1980) (comparison of
trade secrets, copyrights, with patents).
7. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (claims must define statutory subject matter); id. §
102 (invention must be new); id. § 103 (invention must be non-obvious to one skilled in art);
id. § 112 (claims must specifically disclose invention).
8. See Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1974); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976). The language of this statute is derived from the Patent Act of 1793, which has
remained intact except for the substitution of the word "process" for "art." See S. REP. No.
1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 23962399.
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). A process includes the transformation or reduction of
literal substances or things. See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876). A process
patent, however, does not require that the machine used in carrying out the process be new
or patentable. See id. at 788. Title 35, section 100(b) of the United States Code defines
process as "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b)(1976). The term
"manufacture" is defined as "the production of articles for use from raw materials prepared
by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by
hand-labor or by machinery." See American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1,
11 (1931) (immersing fruit in solution to render it resistant to mold decay not manufacture).
The term "machine" includes "every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result." Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853) (machine for rolling masses of iron into balls).
"Composition of matter" has been construed to include "all compositions of two or more
substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders, or solids." Shell Dev. Co.
v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957); 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 14, at 55
(1st ed. 1937).
10. See Cusano v. Kotler, 159 F.2d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 1947) (patent on game board
granted as useful); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (1976). Utility means an invention must perform
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and adequate disclosure.1 s Although each of these conditions are important in determining whether an invention deserves patent protection, the
novelty requirement lies at the core of the patent system." Section 101
requires the subject matter to be "new,"' 5 while the section 102 novelty

some function of positive benefit to society. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35
(1966) (chemical process for making certain steroids not useful). The concept of utility has

been derived from the term "useful" as used in the language of section 101 and the section
112 requirement that a patent application teach a person with ordinary skill in the art how
"to make and use" the invention. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (1976). See generally Note, The
Utility Requirement In The Patent Law, 53 GEo. L.J. 154, 156 (1964).
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Novelty or newness is the sine qua non of every invention. See Nickola v. Peterson, 410 F.Supp. 590, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 898
(6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979). To be entitled to patent protection one
must be the first inventor. See FMC Corp. v. F.E. Myers & Bro. Co., 384 F.2d 4, 9 (6th Cir.
1967). Determinations of novelty are made in light of the prior art, which is that fund of
information available or accessible to the public. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (novelty involves comparison with prior art); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976) (no
patent issues if invention known or used by others).
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The statute reads in pertinent part: "A patent may not
be obtained. . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains . . . . Id. The Supreme Court has held that a patent for a new product
could not be upheld if its construction required no more than the "skill. . . possessed by all
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business." Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 248, 267 (1850). The Court has also established three steps to be followed in dealing
with this issue: first, the scope and content of the prior art is to be determined; second, the
difference between the prior art and the claims in issue is to be determined; and third, the
level of skill of persons trained in the art at the time of the invention is to be determined.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also Anderson's-Black Rock v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1969) (method of paving obvious).
13. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336, 358
(1961); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). The inventor must file an application which includes specifications, claims, and a drawing. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) (applicants must define with
particularity the subject matter which is regarded to be invention). See also Purdue Research Foundation v. Watson, 265 F.2d 107, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (patent claims must define
invention). Under section 112, the inventor must adequately set forth and describe three
items: the invention, the manner and process of making and using the invention, and the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1976).
14. See Nickola v. Peterson, 410 F.Supp. 590, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("to be patentable,
any claimed invention must satisfy the requirement of 'novelty'... "), af'd, 580 F.2d 898
(6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1979). See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961-64
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (invention which is statutory but not novel is unpatentable).
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Section 101 provides three main requirements of patentability: novelty, utility, and statutory subject matter. See id. § 101. "That these three
requirements are separate and distinct" however, "is long-standing and has been universally
accepted." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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requirement defines "new" by negative implication. 6 The question of the
invention's newness, however, is not dispositive of whether it constitutes
patentable subject matter under section 101.17 Only if a patent claim is
patentable subject matter according to section 101, will the test of novelty
under section 102 be applied.' 8 Outside the realm of patent protection are
ideas,' 9 scientific principles, 0 phenomena of nature,"' mental processes or
steps,2 2 and mathematical equations or formulas.2 3
Relying on the "mental steps" doctrine under section 101,24 the Patent

16. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) (seven factors which defeat claim of novelty).
17. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 960-61 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (question of invention's novelty
unrelated to whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter); Reeves
Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 270 (9th Cir. 1971) ("no warrant exists for looking to word 'new' in § 101 for understanding or application of the novelty
requirement").
18. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). The Supreme Court has directed that
a determination that statutory subject matter under section 101 exists precede the inquiries
under sections 102 and 103. See id. at 593. Accord, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961-64
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
19. See, e.g., Patent Clothing Co. v. Glover, 141 U.S. 560, 564 (1891) (bridging strip of
cloth across fly of pantoloons to reinforce against tearing); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) (placing rubber eraser on end of pencil); Wyeth v.
Stone, 30 F.Cas. 723, 724 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) (cutting ice to uniform size).
20. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (theory of relativity
(E=mc2 ) would not have been patentable); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-13
(1853) (claims directed at electro-magnetism); Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F.Cas.
879, 882-883 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) (use of ether as surgical anesthesia not patentable).
21. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (inoculants of bacteria); General Elec. Co. v. DeForest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1928)
(tungsten); In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (use of uranium). But see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (genetically-altered microorganism constitutes patentable subject matter).
22. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168-70 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (petroleum prospecting method by use of echoes); In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 556-58 (C.C.P.A. 1945) (mental
steps unpatentable); Ex parte Meinhardt, 1907 Dec. Com. Pat. 237, 238 (system for spacing
free-hand letters).
23. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65-66 (1972) (method for converting
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 769
(C.C.P.A. 1980) (claims not patentable if "no substance apart from the calculations involved"); In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1392-93 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (mathematical equation
for computing porosity of sub-surface formations). The rationale of these limitations on patentability is to prevent the pre-emption of entire fields of science and the establishment of a
monopoly on human thought. See MacKay v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). The
Court in MacKay stated: "While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be." Id. at 94. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75
(1852) (no one can claim exclusive right in principle). See generally D. CHISUM, PATENTS §
1.03(2), at 1-43 (1981) (discussion of rules concerning patentability of principles).
24. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 821-22 (9th Cir.
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Office routinely denied patents on computer programs or software.2 5 If a
patent application described a process that could be performed entirely
mentally, or with the aid of pencil and paper, it was rejected because a
monopoly could not be granted for a cogitative process.2 6 Similarly, a process which amounted to nothing more than a description of the function
of a machine was held unpatentable.2 1 In addition, several policy considerations were used to support the denial of computer program patentability including administrative convenience, the difficulty in making an adequate patent search, and the availability of other forms of trade
protection. 8 Moreover, the approach of the Patent Office had the support
of the computer hardware industry.2 9

1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 1 (1946). A mental step or act is one which may be
performed by the human mind without the intervention of physical instrumentalities. See
generally McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine:Its Origin,Legal Basis, and Scope, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1148, 1169 (1970); D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.03(6)[a], at 1-59 (1978).
25. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168-70 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (method for petroleum
prospecting through echoes); In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 383 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (mathematical
procedure for construction of airfoil); In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1933)
(method of producing printed publication from manuscripts). The status of statutory subject matter was denied to certain methods or processes; either because they could be completely performed by a human, or they required the use of the human intellect for their
performance. See In re Cooper, 134 F.2d 630, 631-32 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (mathematical formula
relating to producing steel); Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58, 67 (9th Cir. 1932) (method
of counterbalancing engine main shaft not patentable). See generally McClaskey, The
Mental Process Doctrine: Its Origin, Legal Basis, and Scope, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1148, 1162
(1970). In 1968, the Patent Office adopted a set of guidelines for patent examiners which
stated, "computer programming per se, whether defined in the form of process or apparatus
shall not be patentable." 33 Fed. Reg. 15609 (1968). "Software" is defined as computer programs. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978). "Hardware" consists of the general
physical machinery of the computer such as printed circuit boards, cables, power supplies,
memories, card readers, line'printers, and terminals. See generally M. WEIK, STANDARD DicTIONARY OF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING

152 (1970).

26. See In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168-70 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Cooper, 134 F.2d 630,
631-32 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
27. See Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1853). The "function of a machine" doctrine is generally traced to the Corning decision, in which the Court stated it was
well settled that "a man cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it." Id. at 268. See, e.g., Expanded Metal
Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909) (mere function of machine not patentable); Busch
v. Jones, 184 U.S. 598, 607 (1902) (operation and effect of machine not patentable); Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 554-57 (1898) (mere function of a machine cannot be patented).
28. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT ON PATENT LAW 13 (1966).
The Commission noted that, without patent protection, the software industry had expanded
satisfactorily. See id. at 15. Although trade secret and copyright protection are sometimes
used in the software field, they are of only limited value. See generally Note, Adequate
Legal Protection For Computer Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 369, 376.
29. See D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE § 1.03 (1980). The
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Beginning in 1968, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decisions determined that computer programs could come
within the category of statutory subject matter."0 The CCPA decided that
patent protection for a computer program should not be foreclosed
merely because the process may be performed mentally, if the steps of
the claimed process could also be accomplished without any element of
mental operation.31 The CCPA also rejected the principle that claims in a
patent application may be dissected into old and new elements and
thereby, defeat an entire computer program claim simply because a por32
tion of the claim is unstatutory.
The United States Supreme Court has, on two occasions, specifically
addressed the issue of whether computer programs constituted patentable
subject matter under section 101.1 s In Gottschalk v. Benson,34 the Court
rejected claims for a patent on software because a patent would give the
claimant a monopoly on a mathematical formula." The Court in Parker

hardware firms opposed patentability for computer programs as a process because it would
severely limit the free use of their computers. It was standard practice for hardware manufacturers to supply free software with hardware, as a total package for customers. See generally Note, Computer Software: Beyond The Limits of Existing ProprietaryProtection Pol-

icy, 40

BROOKLYN

L.

REV.

116, 127 n.82 (1973).

30. See, e.g., In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (analysis of data
words in computer-controlled system patentable); In re McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 1398
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (machine implementation versus mental implementation not dispositive in
defining statutory subject matter); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 746-47 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (automatic synchronization by computer program, of receiver of digital information
patentable).
31. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969). The court stated that the Supreme Court's discussion of "process" in Cochrane v. Deener had not been intended to limit process claims to operations on physical
processes, but rather meant a process is not limited to the particular physical apparatus or
machine used in performing it. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1388-89 (C.C.P.A. 1968),
modified, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). See also Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88
(1876). The CCPA also overruled the "function of a machine" doctrine. See In re TarczyHornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 867 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
32. See In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The CCPA stated that they
rejected "the broad notion that if a portion of a claim be non-statutory the whole claim is
ipso facto non-statutory." Id. at 158. See also In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
33. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) ("case turns entirely on the proper
construction of § 101 of the Patent Act "); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972)
("issue is whether the method described and claimed is a 'process' " under section 101).
34. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
35. See id. at 71-72. The Court found that the mathematical formula could be performed without a computer; therefore, the grant of a patent would remove the formula from
the public domain. See id. at 67. See generally Note, Computer Software: Beyond The
Limits of Existing Proprietary Protection Policy, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 116, 123 (1973);
Note, Patentability:Piecing Together The Computer Software Patent Puzzle, 19 ST. Louis
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v. Flook" was confronted with the patentability of a process which in-

cluded the use of a computer program and a mathematical formula for

updating alarm limits in a petroleum refining process.8 7 Relying on Benson and two previous decisions dealing with subject matter patentability,"8 the Flook Court found the claims did not define statutory subject
matter.3 9 The claims in Flook were drawn to a method for computing the
alarm limit.4 0 Since an alarm limit is simply a number, the Supreme
Court concluded that the application sought only to protect a formula for
41
computing this number.
2
In Diamond v. Diehr,4
the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a patent claim for a process of molding rubber products
utilizing a mathematical equation and a computer program defined statutory subject matter under title'35, section 101 of the United States
Code."' The majority reaffirmed the principle that a mathematical

U. L. J. 351, 369 (1975).
36. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
37. See id. at 585. When the variables of the formula exceeded a pre-set alarm limit, an
alarm would signal if an unusual condition or danger were present. See id. at 585. The
CCPA had reversed the Patent & Trademark Office Board of Appeals, finding that Benson
applied only to claims which entirely pre-empted a mathematical formula or algorithm, and
not those which limited its use in conjunction with a claimed process. See In re Flook, 559
F.2d 21, 22-23 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
38. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972) (mathematical formula non-patentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (invention
from scientific principle must come from application of same to new and useful end); MacKay Radio & Tele. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (wire arrangement in directional antenna system determined by application and calculation of mathematical formula).
The Benson Court had defined "algorithm" as a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). By analogizing algorithm with computer programs, the Benson Court was able to rely on that body of law
declaring ideas or' mathematical formulas to be unpatentable. See id. at 67; Rubber-Tip
Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
39. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978). The majority analyzed the claims
under section 101 on the premise that the mathematical equation was a familiar part of the
prior art. See id. at 591. But cf. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (invention
which reassigned priorities of programming in multiprogram competing system not part of
prior art). The CCPA had previously rejected the notion "that a claim may be dissected, the
claim components searched in the prior art, and if the only component found novel is
outside the statutory classes of invention, the claim may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101."
In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976). For CCPA criticism of Flook, see In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 964-65 (C.C.P.A. 1979) and In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
40. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
41. See id. at 585, 586.
42. -U.S.-,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1981).
43. See id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1051, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 160.
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formula in isolation is non-patentable subject matter," but determined
Diehr and Lutton claimed a "process" incorporating an equation and a
computer program.4 5 The Court concluded that the industrial process for
molding precision rubber products is the type of process the patent laws
were designed to protect." Moreover, the Diehr Court decided a process
which is otherwise statutory, does not become non-statutory merely be-7
cause a mathematical equation and a computer program are involved.
The majority distinguished Flook, finding that the claimants in the instant case did not seek to pre-empt a mathematical equation, but sought
only to foreclose others from its use in conjunction with the other steps of
the claimed process." The Diehr Court, therefore, sustained the patent
claims as defining statutory subject matter under section 101. 4 9
The four dissenting Justices argued the facts in Diehr were not distinguishable from those in Flook.50 The dissent contended the majority had
misread what Diehr and Lutton claimed to have invented, asserting the
claims were merely an improved method for calculating the time the mold
should stay closed during the curing process."1 According to the dissent,
the question of computer program patentability involves policy considerations which should be resolved by Congress.5 2 The dissent also concluded
that the patent application made no contribution to the prior art because
the process of molding rubber was not new.sa

44. See id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1056, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 165; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
45. See Diamond v. Diehr, -. U.S.... -,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056, 67 L.Ed.2d 155, 166
(1981).

46. See id. at

-,

101 S. Ct. at 1055, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 164. The Court restated the

definition of "process", first enunciated in Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)
and followed in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1972), as a method or means of
producing a certain result or effect. See Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.-,
-,
101 S. Ct. 1048,
1054-55, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 163-64 (1981).
47. See Diamond v. Diehr, .. U.S.....-,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 166
(1981).
48. See id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1056, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 166; cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 589-90 (1978) (claimant sought partial pre-emption of mathematical formula).
49. See Diamond v. Diehr, -. U.S.-, -,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1059, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 169
(1981).
50. See id.at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1067-69, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 179-81 (Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, J. J., dissenting).
51. See id. at __, 101 S. Ct. at 1066, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 177-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1071-72, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 183-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In support of this proposition, the dissent cited Benson and Flook, and stated: "The cases
.considering the patentability of program-related inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to determine with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any,
program-related inventions will be patentable." Id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1072, 67 L. Ed. 2d at
185 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1066, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
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The Diehr Court's holding is entirely consistent with title 35, section
101 subject matter standards.5 Although both the majority and dissent
acknowledged that Diehr presented a section 101 statutory subject matter
question, 55 the dissent improperly injected considerations of section 102
novelty into its analysis." The majority in Flook employed the same rationale.5 7 The section 101 requirement of statutory subject matter and the
section 102 novelty standard are distinct because the determination that
an invention constitutes statutory subject matter under section 101 precedes the determination of whether the invention is novel under section
10258 In light of Diehr, the claimed invention in Flook would have defined
statutory subject matter in accordance with section 101.59 Both processes
involved an initial calculation by means of a mathematical formula, condissent relied on the Goodyear patent case, Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722 (1880)
which scrutinized the process of vulcanizing rubber, to support the proposition that the
process of curing rubber is not new or novel. See id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1066 n.25, 67 L. Ed.
2d at 177 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Compare id. at -, 101 S.Ct at 1059, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 169 (improved process for
molding rubber articles patentable) with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (improvements of processes
patentable).
55. See Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.-,
-, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1057-58, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155,
167-68 (1981); id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1060, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
section 101 statutory subject matter issue was the only issue before the Court, although a
patent claim must also satisfy the section 101 novelty requisite. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102
(1976).
56. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.., -, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 1066-67, 67 L. Ed. 2d
155, 177-78 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (considered lack of novelty of rubber curing process) with id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1057, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 167-68 (majority stated novelty is
inappropriate consideration under § 101). The dissent's co-mingling of the two issues stems
from the language in section 101 referring to any "new and useful" process, machine, etc.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). As the majority noted: "[Slection 101 ... is a general statement
of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection .... Specific conditions

for patentability follow and section 102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty."
See Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.., 101 S.Ct. 1048, 1057-58, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 167
(1981).
57. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.., 101 S.Ct. 1048, 1066-67, 67 L. Ed. 2d
155, 177 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Diehr and Lutton do not claim to have discovered
anything new about the process for curing synthetic rubber") with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 591 (1978) ("process itself,

. . .

must be new and useful").

58. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1978) (inquiry must come first under §
101 before determinations of §§ 102-103); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (§
101 determinations .wholly apart from § 102 inquiries). "The obligation to determine what
type of discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of whether that
discovery is, in fact, new or obvious." See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
59. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.-, -, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 1058-59, 67 L. Ed. 2d.
155, 168-69 (1981) (manufacturing process which includes use of mathematical equation and
computer program constitutes statutory subject matter under § 101) with Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978) (refining process which includes use of mathematical formula
and computer program non-patentable subject matter under § 101).
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tinual remeasurement and recalculation of variables such as temperature
and time by means of a computer program, and some use of the value
obtained from the calculation." In Diehr, the "use" was a signal to the
molding press to open automatically; in Flook the "use" was a signal to
terminate or modify the refining process when the calculation reached a
pre-set alarm limit.0 1 The Court, therefore, has limited patent claim analysis under section 101 to only those factors incident to the determination
of statutory subject matter, excluding considerations of novelty relied
upon by the majority in Flook and the dissent in Diehr6 2
Diehr demonstrates a significant exercise of judicial review in light of
the Court's caution in previous opinions.68 The Supreme Court, nevertheless, correctly interpreted the broad statutory language of the Patent Act
in light of a new technological development.6 4 The four classes of statutory subject matter under section 101 have been reinterpreted to cover
most of the new technologies that evolved during the last century and a
half such as the telegraph, telephone, electric lamp, airplane, transistor,
neutronic reactor, and the laser. 5 It is unclear, however, whether Diehr
60. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.-,
-, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1052 n.5, 67 L. Ed. 2d
155, 161 n.5 (1981) with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
61. See Diamond v. Diehr, -. U.S.-, -,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1052, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 161
(1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
62. See Diamond v. Diehr, -U.S.....-,
101 S. Ct. 1048, 1057-58, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155,
167-68 (1981) ("novelty ... of no relevance in determining whether ... subject matter of a
claim falls within . . . § 101").
63. Compare id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1059, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 168 (Congress intended
statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man") with
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1978) ("[wle must proceed cautiously when ... asked
to extend patent rights into areas ... unforeseen by Congress") and Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) ("if these programs are . . . patentable, considerable problems are
raised which only committees of Congress can manage").
64. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1980) (language of Patent Act
must be given broad construction to foster productive efforts). See also, Diamond v. Diehr,
-U.S ....
, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1054, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155, 163 (1981) ("a process has historically enjoyed patent protection"). In upholding the patent claim before it, the Chakrabarty
Court stated:
It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken it is 'the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' Congress has performed its
constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in section 101; we perform
ours in construing the language Congress has employed . . . . The subject matter
provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional
and statutory goal of promoting 'the progress of science and the usefularts' with all
that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.
Id. at 315 (citation omitted); See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888) (patent on
the Bell telephone); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 121 (1853) (Morse patent on
the telegraph).
65. See, e.g., The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1895) (Edison's
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will have a significant effect on the computer industry. The Patent Office
and some commentators predicted a flood of patent applications should
patentability be extended to computer programs." In the immediate aftermath of Diehr, this prediction appears to be exaggerated."s
Diehr is yet another example of the Court's recognition of an important
technological development, and its potential benefit to industry and society. The decision clarifies the body of law concerning section 101 subject
matter standards by eliminating considerations of section 102 novelty
from the determination of patentable subject matter under section 101.
Although the Diehr Court did not expressly proclaim the patentability of
computer programs, it has made, by extending the language of the Patent
Act, the advantages of patentability available to unique software and
other similar technologies developed in the future.
Edward W. Roush, Jr.

electric lamp); Gould v. Schawlow & Townes, 363 F.2d 908, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (invention
of laser); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (method of achieving nuclear
reaction in a neutronic reactor).
66. See, e.g., Gemignani, Legal ProtectionFor Computer Software: The View From '79,
7 RUTGERS J. COMP., TECH. & LAW 269, 310 (1980) (software protection would lead to
proliferation of administrative problems); Keeffe, ProtectingSoftware: Is It Worth All The
Trouble?, 62 A.B.A.J. 906, 907 (1976) (congressional inaction in extending protection may be

implicit recognition of administrative problem);

PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON THE PATENT SYSTEM,
REPORT ON PATENT LAW 13 (1966) (Patent Office could not effectively process the flood of

applications which would inevitably flow).
67. Telephone interview with Isacc Fleishman, Director of Information Services, United
States Patent and Trademark Office, in Washington, D.C. (July 30, 1981). Patent and
Trademark Office officials indicate that there has not been a flood of patent applications on
software. Id.
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